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Abstract
In the present paper, syntax and semantics will be presented for an
expansion of ordinary n-agent QML with constant domain, non-rigid con-
stants, rigid variables and including both functions, relations, and equal-
ity. Further, the number of agents will be specified axiomatically thus
ensuring maximal flexibility wrt. the cardinality of the set of agents. Do-
main, variables, and constants will be partitioned in an agent-part and
an object-part and the syntax will be expanded to include strings of the
type ∀xKxφ as wff’s of the language. This will enhance expressiveness re-
garding the epistemic status of agents. Such a term-modal version of the
logic K is shown to be sound and complete wrt. the class of (appropriate)
frames, and a term-version of S4 is shown to be sound and complete wrt.
the class of (appropriate) frames in which the relations are transitive. It
should be noted that completeness is shown via the framework of canon-
ical models and thus allows for non-complicated generalizations to other
logics than the term-versions of K and S4.
"Remember... All I’m offering is the truth. Nothing more."
−Morpheus
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1 Introduction
In a passage of [2] Descartes reflects on what can be known and famously con-
cludes that “I think, therefore I am”. As the insight presented in “the cogito” has
a central place in classic epistemology it is of natural interest for the student
of formal epistemology to answer the question of how such a “quote” might be
formalized. What is noticeable is the reflexive nature of the cogito, i.e. the
fact that it deals with an agent’s reflections on itself. One might go about for-
malizing the cogito in some epistemic modal logic: Propositional modal logic,
represented by the Backus-Naur form, is given as
P ::= ¬P | P → Q | KiP
and to express the sentiment of the cogito we would have to device propositional
formulas P1, ..., Pn and interpret Pi as “agent i is”. Under this ascription, KiPi
reads “agent i knows that she is”, and the question then becomes how to formalize
“I think”. A natural choice would be Kiφ for some tautology φ, since for instance
any thinking being ought to “know” e.g. p ∨ ¬p, and anyone knowing such a
thing is certainly a thinking being. The cogito then, would amount to
Ki(p∨¬p)→ KiPi, the Ki’s being modal operators, and the index set in one-to-
one correspondence with some fitting set of agents. Three things are noteworthy;
first, in order to express the cogito for a set of agents one would have to do so
rather crudely by conjunction and secondly, any relation between “agent i” and
the subscript of the modal operator has to be stated in meta-language, i.e.
the agents are nowhere to be seen in the semantics and thirdly, dealing with
propositional logic there is no intra-logical connection between the entities of
which the propositions speak and the semantics. The situation is slightly better
in standard first-order modal logic due to the enhanced expressivity that comes
with the introduction of quantifiers and relations; represented by its Backus-
Naur form standard first-order modal logic yields the following syntax:
φ ::= R(t1, ..., tn) | ¬φ|φ→ ψ | ∀xφ|Kiφ
where R is an n – ary relation symbol, and all the ti’s are terms
1. In this
language, the sentence “agent i knows that she is” is formalized along the lines
of ∃xKi(x = α), assuming that a constants α for each agent, and the cogito
would amount to something along the lines of Ki(φ ∨ ¬φ) → ∃xKi(x = α).
What is important to notice is that in ordinary first-order n – agent modal logic
we have to state the relation between the subscript i of the modal operator
and the referent of α in meta-language, i.e. it is not built-in in the semantics
when “quantifying” over agents by means of the conjunction. What we really
want is the ability to state ∀y
(
Ky(φ ∨ ¬φ) → ∃xKy(x = y)
)
for some agent-
designating variable y, i.e. we want modal operators indexed by terms, we want
the ability to distinguish between those terms that are appropriate for modal
indexation and those that are not, and we want the agents back in the domain!
1Will be defined later in the context of two-sorted term-modal logic.
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In Hintikka’s landmark 1962 book “Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to
the Logic of the Two Notions” he lays the foundation of what is today called
epistemic logic. In this context he discusses syntax for formulas of the form
KαP for some individual constant α, and writes in a footnote:
“Strictly speaking, we ought to distinguish those free individual sym-
bols which can only take names of persons as their substitution-
values and which can therefore serve as subscripts of epistemic op-
erators from those which cannot do so.” [3, pp. 11]
Nevertheless, Hintikka does not present either syntax or semantics for such a
logic, which is what will be accomplished here.
The purpose of the present paper is thus to first state syntax and semantics
for a two-sorted term-modal logic with constant domain, non-rigid constants,
and equality and secondly to state and prove soundness and completeness. As
such the aim is simply for me to hone my technical skills by treating a logic
somewhat more complex than what is normally encountered on undergraduate
level. The following is a merge between the exposition of a term-modal logic in
[5] and the exposition of a many-sorted modal logic in [6]. To remain true to
the epistemic interpretation and for notational convenience I remain two-sorted
even though the generalization to general many-sorted logic is straightforward.
The interested reader is encouraged to do the proper adjustments in order to
obtain the many-sorted version of the logic presented here.
First, language and syntax for a language for a two-sorted term-modal logic is
stated in section 2. Then, in section 3 we present semantics including frames,
interpretations, models and valuations leading up to the notions of truth and
validity in 3.1 and 3.2. In section 4 we turn to an axiomatic system for the
logic, and in 5 a couple of useful results are proved as preparation for a proof
of soundness in section 6. Sections 7 and 8 contains the bulk of the work in
this paper, namely completeness results for the two-sorted term-modal versions
of K and S4, and section 9 relates the results to Hintikka’s thoughts on the
axiom 4 as presented in [3]. As the completeness proof is lengthy and technical
we present a quick overview here meant to ease the acquisition.
1.1 A Brief Survey of the Proof of Completeness
The key insight regarding the overall proof strategy is contained in Proposi-
tion 2 which states the following: Showing completeness essentially amounts to,
given a consistent set of formulas, constructing an appropriate model satisfying
this set of formulas. The next part of the completeness proof thus consists of
constructing this model starting with the worlds of the model, which we choose
to be a fitting maximally consistent set of formulas. Lindenbaum’s Lemma
(Lemma 7) and the Saturation Lemma (Lemma 8) ensures that it is possible to
extend a given set of formulas to a maximally consistent set, and Lemma 6 then
states some crucial properties of such maximally consistent sets. Definition 25
then presents the canonical model, and Propositions 4, 5, and 6 are technical
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results ensuring that the canonical model is well-defined and stands in appro-
priate relations to the semantics of the logical connectives. Having defined the
worlds of the canonical model as sets of formulas the idea is that a world should
satisfy all and only those formulas which enjoy membership in this particular
world, and that the construction actually has this feature is the content of the
Truth Lemma (Lemma 9). With the Truth Lemma in hand the canonical class
Theorem (Theorem 2) is stated and proved, the consequence of which is that
any appropriate logic is complete wrt. the class of canonical models. As an ap-
plication of the above, completeness of the “term-modal” version of S4 is proven
in Theorem 3.
2 The Language L
σ
TM and Syntax
Fix an agent-setA = {α1...αn} at the outset. In this section we add these agents
to the domain of quantification resulting in a two-sorted term-modal logic. The
two sorts will correspond to agents and objects respectively, and “term” refers to
the ability to quantify over indexes in modal operators thus enhancing the ability
to express agents reflecting reflexively about themselves and other agents. In
this section language and syntax for a two-sorted term-modal logic with constant
domain, non-rigid constants, and equality is defined. We start with the syntax.
It is worth noting that the language is not parametrized by the agent-set – rather
the number of agents is specified axiomatically2. Throughout, if v = (x1, ..., xn)
is a vector, denote by vi the i’th element i.e vi = xi.
Definition 1. [Language]. A two-sorted term-modal language L
σ
TM consists of
1. A set σ := {agt, obj} of two sorts.
2. A countable, infinite set VAR of variables, each assigned a sort σ ∈ σ. Let
V ARσ denote the set of σ – variables and assume that both V ARagt and
V ARobj are infinite.
3. A countable (possibly empty) set CON of constants with each constant
assigned a sort. Denote the set of σ – constants CONσ .
4. A countable (possibly empty) set FUN of function symbols, each assigned
an arity α ∈ σk+1 for some k ≥ 0. Denote the set of function symbols
with α – arity FUNα.
5. A countable (possibly empty) set REL of relation symbols, each assigned
an arity β ∈ σk for some k ≥ 1. Denote the set of relations with β – arity
RELβ.
6. The equality symbol =.
7. A set of modal operators Kt indexed by agent-referring terms (to be de-
fined shortly).
2See axiom N in section 4.
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8. The logical connectives ¬ and →.
9. The universal quantifier ∀.
A couple of comments are in order before we proceed to define terms. First, the
set σ of sorts is meant to model the distinction between agents and objects. For
readability the sorts are simply denoted “agt” and “obj” but readers interested
in generalizing to n-sorted logic might wish to think of these in more generic
terms3. For the special notion of arity employed in 4. notice that the arity is
now a vector which i’th entry is the sort of the i’th input term except from the
last entry describing the sort of the resulting term. The case with relations are
completely analogous so we turn towards the notion of a term.
Definition 2. [Terms] The set Term(L
σ
TM ) of terms is defined inductively by
1. V AR ∪CON ⊆ Term(L
σ
TM ), and
2. If f ∈ FUNα with α ∈ σ
k+1 and t1, ..., tk ∈ Term(L
σ
TM ) where ti is of
sort αi then f(t1, ..., tk) ∈ Term(L
σ
TM ).
The set Termσ of σ – terms is defined as the smallest subset of Term(L
σ
TM )
such that
1. V ARσ ∪CONσ ⊆ Termσ, and
2. If f ∈ FUNα with α ∈ σ
k+1 such that αk+1 = σ and t1, ..., tk ∈ Term(L
σ
TM )
where ti is of sort αi then f(t1, ..., tk) ∈ Termσ.
Specifically, the set Termagt is what we will call the set of agent-referring terms.
We can now qualify point 7. in Definition 1 by defining the set K of modal
operators by
K := {Kt|t ∈ Termagt}
The set of L
σ
TM well-formed formulas is now definable:
Definition 3. [Well-formed formulas] The set of L
σ
TM well-formed formulas is
defined inductively by:
1. If t1, t2 ∈ Term(L
σ
TM ) then the expression t1 = t2 is an atomic wff of the
language, and
2. If P ∈ RELβ with β ∈ σ
k and t1, ..., tn ∈ Term(L
σ
TM ) where ti is of sort
βi then P (t1, ..., tk) is an atomic wff of the language, and
3. If φ and ψ are atomic wffs, t ∈ Termagt, and x ∈ V AR then the remaining
wffs of the language is defined by the Backus-Naur form:
3One option would be to simply define the set of sorts as σ = {σ1, σ2} thus making the
generalization completely straightforward.
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ϕ ::= ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ψ | ∀xϕ | Ktϕ
Please note that the remaining logical connectives are defined in the ordinary
way while the existential quantifier ∃ and the modal operators Pt are defined as
duals of ∀ and Kt respectively – this is also completely standard.
Before moving on we define the notion of a free variable. For the most part it
is completely standard but for the set K of modal operators something new is
going on.
Definition 4. [Free variable] We define a free variable inductively by
1. For any term t the free variables are just the variables occurring in t, and
2. For any atomic formula φ the free variables are the free variables of the
terms of φ, and
3. For formulas φ, ψ the free variables of ¬φ and φ → ψ are just the free
variables of φ and ψ, and
4. For each formula of the form Ktφ the free variables are just the variables
of t joined with the free variables of φ, and
5. The free variables of ∀xφ are any free variable of φ excluding x.
Any occurring variable not free is referred to as bound. Furthermore, any for-
mula without any free variables is called a sentence. Where φ is a formula, t
is a term, and x a variable we denote by φ(t/x) the result of substituting any
free occurrence of x for t, demanding that no free variable of t becomes bound
by doing so4.
This concludes the syntactic definitions, which do not differ much from the
syntax of standard many-sorted modal logic as presented in e.g. in [6]. The new
part is that we can quantify over indexes for modal operators, that is expressions
of the type ∀xKxφ are now wffs of the language. Of course such syntactic add-
ons are in need of a semantic counterpart; thus turning to semantics we put the
agents A back in the domain!
3 Semantics
Before moving on one bit of notation is needed. Where A and B are sets, take
A∪˙B to mean the disjoint union of A and B.
Definition 5. [TMσA – frame] A TM
σ
A – frame F for the language L
σ
TM is a
triple F := 〈W ,R, DOM〉 where
1. W is a non-empty set of worlds, and
4What then do we take φ(t/x) to mean, if in fact some free variable in t does become bound
by the substitution? We simply substitute φ for an appropriate alphabetic variant which is
always possible. See [4] pp. 241.
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2. R is a map associating binary accessibility relations on W to each agent,
that is R : A→ P(W ×W), and
3. DOM = DOMagt∪˙DOMobj is the domain of quantification, where neither
of the cojoints are empty and DOMagt = A.
Take Ri to mean R(αi) and write wRiw
′ whenever w,w′ ∈ W are such that
(w,w′) ∈ R(αi).
Next up is the notion of an interpretation but before bringing the technical
definition a few comments are in order. We are currently defining a logic with
non-rigid functions, relations, and constants which is naturally reflected in the
definition above. Also, as we now have to take care what sort of term goes into
each place of functions and relations the notion of arity is slighty more complex
than the ordinary natural number cf. Definition 1.
Definition 6. [Interpretation] An interpretation I is a map such that simulta-
neously
1. For each β ∈ σk let I : RELβ ×W → P(
∏
i∈{1...k}DOMβi), and
2. For each α ∈ σk+1 let I : FUNα ×W → P(
∏
i∈{1...k+1}DOMαi)
5, and
3. I(=, w) = {(d, d)|d ∈ DOM} for every w ∈ W , and
4. For each σ ∈ σ let I : CONσ ×W → DOMσ.
Definition 7. [Model] The two-tuple 〈F , I〉 consisting of a frame and an inter-
pretation is called a model and we write M = 〈F , I〉. In this case we say that
M is based on F .
Having dealt with relation symbols, function symbols, equality and constants the
only remaining task is to interpret free variables. For this we need a valuation:
Definition 8. [Valuation] A valuation v is a (surjective) map such that for each
σ ∈ σ we have v : V ARσ → DOMσ.
For technical reasons we need one more definition before we turn to truth.
Namely, we need the notion of an x-variant to deal with formulas involving ∀.
Definition 9. [x - variant] An x-variant v′ of a valuation v is a valuation such
that v′ and v agrees on all variables except possibly for x. We note that any
valuation is an x – variant of itself.
For brevity we shall write tw,v for the extension of the term t at world w
under valuation v, that is:
5In reality, I maps into the power set of a subset of
∏
i∈{1...k+1}DOMαi : Namely the
subset defined by the rule that if {DOMαi}i∈{1...k+1} and {DOMγi}i∈{1...k+1} are such that
DOMαi = DOMγi for i ∈ {1...k} it hold that DOMγk+1 = DOMαk+1 .
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tw,v =
{
v(t) t ∈ V AR
I(t, w) t ∈ CON
It is useful to note that for any agent-referring term t the composite R(tw,v)
denotes an accessibility relation in R.
3.1 Truth
Definition 10. [Truth for non-modal formulas] Let M = 〈W ,R, DOM, I〉 be
a model, w ∈ W , and v a valuation. We define truth in the model M at w ∈ W
for the formula φ ∈ L
σ
TM inductively by:
1. M, w |=v P (t1...tk) iff (t
w,v
1 ...t
w,v
k ) ∈ I(P,w), and
2. M, w |=v t1 = t2 iff t
w,v
1 = t
w,v
2 , and
3. M, w |=v ¬φ iff it is not the case that M, w |=v φ, and
4. M, w |=v φ→ ψ iff either M, w |=v ψ or M, w |=v ¬φ, and
5. M, w |=v ∀xφ iff M, w |=v φ for every x - variant v
′ of v.
And we notice that whenever φ is a sentence we can omit explicit mentioning
of the valuation and simply write M, w |= φ.
Definition 11. [Truth for modal formulas] Let M = 〈M,R, DOM, I〉 be a
model, w ∈ W , v a valuation, φ ∈ L
n,σ
TM , and t an agent-referring term. We
define truth in the model M at w for modal formulas inductively by:
1. M, w |=v Ktφ iff M, w
′ |=v φ for every w
′ such that (w,w′) ∈ R(tw,v),
and
2. M, w |=v Ptφ iff M, w
′ |=v φ for at least one w
′ such that
(w,w′) ∈ R(tw,v).
3.2 Validity
Above we defined the most basic notion of truth namely that of truth in a
world of a model under a given valuation. As the aim of the project is to
state and prove completeness, it shall be of paramount importance for us to be
able to distinguish truth at different levels. As we shall see later the notion of
satisfiability will play a key role in proving completeness.
Definition 12. [Validity and Satisfiability] A formula φ is satisfiable if there
exists a model M, a world w and a valuation v such that M, w |=v φ. Further,
if φ is such that M, w |=v φ for all valuations we say that φ is valid at world
w, and we write M, w |= φ. We say that a formula φ is valid in the model M
if M, w |= φ for all w ∈ W and we write M |= φ. If a formula φ is valid in all
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models based on a frame F we say that φ is valid in F and we write F |= φ. We
say that a formula φ is valid on the class F of frames if F |= φ for all F ∈ F
and we write this F |= φ. If φ is valid on the class of all frames we simply say
that φ is valid and write |= φ.
Please recall that we require formulas to be finite. Yet, sometimes we wish to
speak about infinite strings of symbols so it is advantageous for us to introduce
a bit of notation to deal with this. So, whenever Γ is an arbitrarily large set of
formulas we writeM, w |=v Γ,M, w |= Γ and so forth to mean the obvious. We
ask the reader to also note that whenever S is a class of models a model from S
simply means some model M for which M ∈ S, while if F is a class of frames
a model from F is a model based on some frame F ∈ F , that is M = 〈F , I〉 for
some interpretation I. I shall write M ∈ F for a model based on some frame
F ∈ F , and write that M is a model from F . We are now in position to define
the semantic consequence relation:
Definition 13. [Semantic Consequence] Let φ be a formula, Γ be a set of
formulas, and S a class of structures (either models or frames). We say that φ
is a semantic consequence of Γ and write Γ |=S φ if it holds in all models M
from S, for all valuations v and all worlds w of M that if M, w |=v Γ then
M, w |=v φ.
Having defined the semantic consequence relation we are in position to clarify
the notion of a semantically specified logic:
Definition 14. [Semantically Specified Logic] Given a language L, and a class
S of structures (either models or frames) formulated in L, we define the logic
LS := {φ | |=S φ}.
We proceed directly to the first Proposition of the project.
Proposition 1. [Principle of Replacement] Let φ be a formula, x, y variables,
M a model, w a world, and v a valuation. Then it holds that if v′ is an x -
variant of v with v(x) = v′(y) then
M, w |=v φ iffM, w |=v′ φ(y/x)
Proof. Seeing that the only leeway after fixing model and world is the interpre-
tation of free variables via the valuation, and φ(y/x) differs only from φ in that
φ(y/x) has a free occurrence of y everywhere that φ has a free occurrence of x,
and v and v′ agrees everywhere except for x where v(x) = v′(y) the Proposition
follows.
Having established a thorough semantic description of the two-sorted term-
modal logic we now aim to provide the proof-theoretical counterpart; indeed the
overall purpose of the project is to show that these two descriptions amount to
the same thing. As such we now turn to the axioms.
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4 An Axiomatic System of KTM
A,σ
In this section we define the two-sorted term-modal logic version of the concept
of normal logics. We will denote the resulting logic for n agents over the language
L
σ
TM by KTM
A,σ and begin by stating what axioms are to hold. Then we
proceed to the definition of a KTM
A,σ- proof before we are ready to define
normality in the new setting. The section concludes with three Propositions
that shall be of help to us when proving completeness later on.
4.1 Axiom Schemas of KTM
A,σ
First of all, we let all substitution instances of valid formulas from Propositional
modal logics be axioms of KTM
A,σ6. Furthermore, we add the following axiom
schemas:
Let φ ∈ LσTM be any formula and y any variable free in φ. Then every
instance of
∀xϕ→ ϕ (y/x) (∀)
is an axiom. Further, for any term t
t = t (Id)
are axioms. Also, in order to accommodate the partition of terms in sorts
we include for each x ∈ V ARagt and y ∈ V ARobj the axiom
x 6= y (MSD)
Dealing with a language including equality we also add the Principle of
Substitutivity such that for any variables x, y and any formula φ we have
(x = y)→
(
ϕ(x)→ φ(y)
)
(PS)
as an axiom7. We note that as variables are rigid the stated version of PS
should be of no concern. We also add Existence of Identicals, such that for any
constant c
(c = c)→ ∃x(x = c) (∃Id)
is an axiom. For technical reasons we also need to make sure that the agent-
part of the domain always contain the appropriate number of element. So, for
any x1, ...x|A|, y ∈ V ARagt we have as an axiom:
∃x1...x|A|
(
x1 6= x2 ∧ ... ∧ x|A|−1 6= x|A| ∧ ∀y(y = x1 ∨ ... ∨ y = x|A|)
)
(N )
6That is, any formula obtained from a Propositional axiom by substituting Propositional
variables for formulas from L
n,σ
TM
.
7Where φ involves the modal operator Kx we obviously requires x and y to be agent-
referring.
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We further include a version of the axiom K, such that for any agent-
referring term t and any formulas φ and ψ we have
Kt(φ→ ψ)→ (Ktφ→ Ktψ) (K)
as an axiom of the system KTM
A,σ too. We also choose to add the Barcan
Formula for interplay between quantifiers and modal operators such that for
any agent-referring term t and any variable x 6= t we have the axiom
∀xKtφ→ Kt∀xφ (BF )
and lastly; for any variables x and y, and any agent-referring term t we add
the axiom Knowledge of Non-identity:
(x 6= y)→ Kt(x 6= y) (KNI)
And we note that the axiomDual is unnecessary since we have simply defined
the operator Pt such that Pt := ¬Kt¬.
4.2 Inference Rules of KTM
A,σ
The strategy when defining a logic in a syntactical matter is to first state a set Λ
of axioms and then to close it off under rules of inference such that the resulting
logic can be defined as Λ8 by a slight abuse of notation. First, we choose to
include modus ponens. That is for any formulas φ and ψ
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
(MP )
is a valid inference. Also, we include Knowledge Generalization among our
rules of inference such that for every agent-referring term t we have
φ
Ktφ
(KG)
as a valid inference. Finally, if φ is without free occurrences of x we let
φ→ ψ
φ→ ∀xψ
. (Gen)
Having established axioms and rules of inference we are ready to define the
notion of a KTM
A,σ– proof.
Definition 15. [KTM
A,σ – proof] A KTM
A,σ – proof is a finite sequence of
formulas from L
σ
TM , each of which is either a KTM
A,σ – axiom or the result of
using some rule of inference on one or more earlier formulas of the sequence. If
φ is a formula we say that φ is KTM
A,σ – provable if it is the last element in
such a sequence and we write ⊢KTMA,σ φ.
8The overline denoting closure.
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Note that at this point we know nothing about the relation between truth as
defined in definitions 10 and 11 on the one side and provability as just defined
on the other. It will be the aim of this project to establish the appropriate
equivalence! Three more concepts shall be defined here before turning to a
couple of handy results – which will also yield an opportunity to see KTM
A,σ
– proofs in action.
Definition 16. [Normality] A normal n – agent two-sorted term-modal logic
Λ is any set of L
σ
TM – formulas containing all of the above axioms closed under
all of the above rules of inference.
Whenever φ ∈ Λ we say that φ is a Theorem of Λ, and write ⊢Λ φ. If Λ1
and Λ2 are two logics such that Λ1 ⊆ Λ2 we say that Λ2 is an extension of Λ1.
Definition 17. [Λ – deducibility] Let Γ be any set of wffs of the language, φ
be any formula, and Λ a logic. Then φ is Γ – deducible from Λ if there exist a
finite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that
⊢Λ Γ0 → φ.
Whenever this obtains, write Γ ⊢Λ φ. Write Γ 6⊢Λ φ if φ is not Λ – deducible
from Γ.
Definition 18. [Λ – consistency] Let Γ be any set of wffs of the language. We
say that Γ is Λ – consistent if for all formulas φ we have
Γ 6⊢Λ φ ∧ ¬φ
and Λ – inconsistent otherwise. Please note that if some arbitrary set of wffs
Γ is inconsistent then there has to exist Γ0 ⊆ Γ finite which is incomplete since
proofs are finite by definition.
Having defined the framework we end this section by the proof-theoretical
counterpart to definition 14:
Definition 19. [Proof-Theoretically Specified Logic] If L is a language, and K
denote a set of axioms together with some rules of inference formulated in L,
we define the logic LK := {φ | ⊢K φ}.
Now, we can express completeness as the inclusion LS ⊆ LK and soundness
as LK ⊆ LS . We proceed to state and prove some Lemmas that shall be of
great use during the proof of completeness.
5 A Couple of Handy Lemmas
Lemma 1. Let x, y ∈ V AR and t ∈ Termagt. Then
⊢KTMA,σ (x = y)→ Kt(x = y).
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Proof. Let φ(z) = Kt(x = z) for any t ∈ Termagt. Then we have by Proposi-
tional calculus that ⊢KTMA,σ (x = y)→
(
Kt(x = x) → Kt(x = y)
)
. Using the
Theorem from Propositional calculus that
(
φ→ (ψ → ϕ)
)
→
(
ϕ→ (φ→ ψ)
)
yields ⊢KTMA,σ Kt(x = x) →
(
(x = y) → (Kt(x = y)
)
. It follows directly
from KG and Id that ⊢KTMA,σ Kt(x = x), and so an application of MP yields
the desired result.
In the following the formula
(x = y)→ Kt(x = y) (KI)
will be called Knowledge of Identity.
Lemma 2. Let t ∈ Termagt, and φ1, ..., φn be wffs of the language. Then the
following holds
⊢KTMA,σ Kt
(
φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn
)
→
(
Ktφ1 ∧ ... ∧Ktφn
)
In the following the formula
Kt
(
φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn
)
→
(
Ktφ1 ∧ ... ∧Ktφn
)
(KD)
will be called K-Distribution.
Proof. We omit the proof as it is fairly standard. See [4] pp. 28.
Lemma 3. Let φ and ψ be wffs of the language, and t ∈ Termagt. Then it
holds that
if ⊢KTMA,σφ→ ψ then ⊢KTMA,σ Ktφ→ Ktψ
Proof. Assume ⊢KTMA,σφ → ψ. By KG we obtain ⊢KTMA,σKt
(
φ → ψ
)
and
thus K yields the desired result.
The last Lemma to be proven here is a small result that is simply practical
to have at hand.
Lemma 4. [Consistency Lemma] Let Γ be any Λ – consistent set of formulas,
and φ any formula. Then either is Γ ∪ {φ} consistent or Γ ∪ {¬φ} is.
Proof. Assume that Γ ∪ {φ} is inconsistent. As Γ is consistent this means that
Γ ⊢Λ ¬φ but then the set Γ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent.
We are now ready to undertake the work of showing soundness, i.e that
any Theorem of our logic is valid wrt. the class of all TMσA – frames, or
equivalently containment of the logic specified via syntax in the logic we have
specified semantically.
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6 Soundness
We start by the central definition:
Definition 20. [Soundness] Let S be a class of structures (either models or
frames), and let Λ be a logic. We say that Λ is sound wrt. S if for every formula
φ of the language we have
if ⊢Λ φ then |=S φ.
And we go about showing soundness for KTM
A,σwrt. the class F of all TMσA –
frames in two steps: First we show that all axioms are valid, and then we show
that validity is preserved by each of the rules of inference.
6.1 Validity of Axioms
We have to show that all of the axioms ∀, Id, PS,∃Id, N, K, BF, and KNI
are valid. In the following let F = 〈W , DOM,R〉.
∀ : We have to show that |=F ∀xφ→ φ(y/x) where x, y ∈ V AR and y has only
free occurrences in φ so assume M, w |=v ∀xφ for arbitrary M ∈ F , w ∈ W ,
and v a valuation. Let v′ be an x – variant of v such that v(x) = v′(y) such
that we have M, w |=v′ φ by the semantics for ∀. By Proposition 1 we obtain
M, w |=v φ(y/x), and as M, w and v was arbitrary this yields the validity of
the axiom ∀ with respect to F .
Id: We have to show that where t is any term we have |=F (t = t), but this is
immediately clear from the semantics of =.
MSC: By the semantics of= and the definition of the valuationMSC is trivially
valid.
PS: We have to show that where x and y are variables and φ any wff we have
|=F (x = y)→
(
φ(x) → φ(y)
)
, which will be accomplished by induction on the
complexity of φ. Assume M, w |=v (x = y) and M, w |=v φ(x) for arbitrary
M ∈ F , w ∈ W and valuation v. By the semantics for = we immediately get
v(x) = v(y) and thus if φ is atomic |=v φ(y) follows readily. This establishes
the induction base. Assume now that we have the result for ψ and wish to
show PS for¬ψ. If M, w |=v (x = y) we get by the induction hypothesis that
|=v
(
¬ψ(x)↔ ¬ψ(y)
)
and as we by assumption have that |=v ¬ψ(x) it yields a
contradiction if |=v ψ(y). As M, w and v was arbitrary we conclude that PS
holds for ¬ψ.
If we know PS for formulas φ and ψ we show that it holds for φ → ψ,
so assume M, w |=v (x = y) and M, w |=v
(
φ(x) → ψ(x)
)
. Now, either
M, w |=v ¬φ(x) or M, w |=v ψ(x) by the semantics for →, but since PS holds
for ¬φ and ψ by the previous and the induction hypothesis this means that either
M, w |=v ¬φ(y) orM, w |=v ψ(y) which in turn implies M, w |=v φ(y)→ ψ(y).
As M, w and v was arbitrary we conclude validity of PS for φ→ ψ.
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If we assume PS for φ it vacously follows that PS holds for ∀xφ so we turn
to the modal case.
Assume PS for φ and let t ∈ Termagt. We show PS forKtφ. To this end, as-
sume that M, w |=v (x = y) for variables x, y ∈ V ARagt
and M, w |=v Kxφ(x). But by the semantics of Kt this means that M, w
′ |=v
φ(x) for any w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ R(xw,v), but then the induction hypothesis
yields that M, w′ |=v φ(y) and as by assumption x
w,v = yw,v we get M, w′ |=v
φ(y) for any w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ R(yw,v). This is exactly the definition of
M, w |=v Kyφ(y) as wanted.
∃Id: We need to show that for any constant c, any M ∈ F , w ∈ W and
valuation v we haveM, w |=v (c = c)→ ∃x(x = c) so assumeM, w |=v (c = c).
By the semantics of ∀ and the definition of ∃ we need to produce a valuation v′
such that v′(x) = cw,v but since all valuations are surjective by definition this
is indeed possible for all constants c and all w ∈ W .
N: This is simply true by construction. The axiom says that there are exactly
|A| = n elements which are quantified over using variables from V ARagt, but
this is precisely the content of definition 5 3.
K: We have to show that for any M ∈ F , w ∈ W , valuation v, agent-denoting
term t, and wffs φ and ψ we have M, w |=v Kt
(
φ → ψ
)
→
(
Ktφ → Ktψ
)
,
so assume M, w |=v Kt
(
φ → ψ
)
. By the semantics of Kt this means that
M, w′ |=v φ → ψ for every w
′ ∈ W with (w,w′) ∈ R(tw,v) but this means
that for all such w′ we have either M, w′ |=v ¬φ or M, w
′ |=v ψ. All in all, we
either haveM, w′ |=v ψ for all w
′ ∈ W with the property that (w,w′) ∈ R(tw,v)
in which case it holds that M, w |=v Ktφ, or we have for some such w
′ that
`M, w′ |=v ¬φ in which caseM, w |=v ¬Ktφ. By the semantics of→ we conclude
M, w |=v Ktφ→ Ktψ which was what we wanted.
BF: We need to show that for anyM∈ F , w ∈ W , valuation v, agent-denoting
term t, variable x 6= t, and wff φ we have M, w |=v ∀xKtφ → Kt∀xφ. Assume
for contradiction that M, w |=v ∀xKtφ yet M, w |=v ¬Kt∀xφ. By the latter
there is some world w′ for which (w,w′) ∈ R(tw,v) such that M, w′ |=v ¬∀xφ
which in turn means that there is v′ an x – variant of v such thatM, w′ |=v′ ¬φ.
However, by the former we get that M, w |=v′ Ktφ and thus M, w
′ |=v′ φ,
yielding a contradiction.
KNI: We have to prove that for any M ∈ F , w ∈ W , valuation v, agent-
denoting term t, variables x and y, we have M, w |=v (x 6= y) → Kt(x 6= y).
Assume M, w |=v (x 6= y). As variables are rigid this will hold in any world,
thus especially those worlds w′ ∈ W such that (w,w′) ∈ R(tw,v).
Having dealt with all the axioms we turn to show that the rules of inference
MP, KG, and Gen preserves validity.
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6.2 Rules of Inference Preserves Validity
MP: We have to show that if φ→ ψ and φ are valid on F then ψ is valid on F ,
so assume that |=F φ→ ψ and |=F φ. By the latter we see that φ is satisfied in
every model based on F , in every world, under every valuation. But then the
semantics for → yields that so must ψ be which is what we wanted.
KG: We have to show that if φ is valid on F then so is Ktφ for any agent-
referring term t, but this is immediately clear from the semantics for Kt.
Gen: We have to show that if φ → ψ is valid on F for wffs φ and ψ with
the variable x not having any free occurrences in φ then φ→ ∀xψ is also valid
on F . Since φ → ψ is valid on F we know from the semantics for → that in
every modelM ∈ F , in every world w ∈ W for every valuation v we have either
M, w |=v ¬φ or M, w |=v ψ so the only way for Gen fail is if in some such
model, world and valuation we have M, w |=v φ, and M, w |=v ψ yet somehow
M, w |=v ¬∀xψ, but this would mean that for some valuation v
′, x – variant
of v, that M, w |=v′ ¬ψ . As x does not occur free in φ M, w |=v φ implies
M, w |=v′ φ, contradicting the validity of φ→ ψ.
Having established validity of the axioms and the validity preservation of the
rules of inference soundness of KTM
A,σ wrt. F is a sitting duck:
Theorem 1. [Soundness] As all KTM
A,σ– axioms are valid on the class F of
all TMσA – frames, and all rules of inference preserves validity we conclude that
KTM
A,σ is sound wrt. F , i.e if ⊢KTMA,σ φ then |=F φ.
Proof. See above.
We now know, that the logic defined by the syntax presented is included in the
logic that follows from the semantic definitions, that is LKTMA,σ ⊆ LF in the
language of definitions 14 and 19. What remains is the opposite inclusion which
will be the topic of the next section.
7 Completeness
We start with the most central definition.
Definition 21. [Completeness] When F is a class of structures (models or
frames) and Λ is a logic, we say that Λ is strongly complete wrt. F if for any set
Γ of wffs, and φ a single wff, if Λ |=F φ then Γ ⊢Λ φ. That is, if φ is a semantic
consequence of Γ on F then Γ proves φ in Λ.
Based on the proof of soundness one might infer that we should prove com-
pleteness by manually show for each valid formula that a proof existed. However,
this will not be the strategy. Consider the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. [IFF] The logic Λ is strongly complete wrt. the class of struc-
tures F (models or frames) iff any Λ – consistent set of formulas Γ is satisfiable
on some structure from F .
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Proof. We first prove that if Λ is complete wrt. F , then every Λ – consistent set
of formulas Γ is satisfiable on some structure from F , so assume completeness
and pick a Λ– consistent set of formulas Γ ∪ {φ}. If Γ ∪ {φ} is not satisfiable
on any structure from F we have Γ |=F ¬φ but then by completeness we get
Γ ⊢Λ ¬φ meaning that Γ ∪ {φ} was Λ– inconsistent after all, a contradiction.
Now, we prove that if any Λ – consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on F ,
then Λ is complete wrt. F . Assume for contradiction that any Λ – consistent
set of formulas is satisfiable on F , yet Λ is not complete wrt. F . This means
for some set of wffs Γ ∪ {φ} that Γ |=F φ yet Γ 6⊢Λ φ. By the latter it follows
that the set Γ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent and so by assumption satisfiable on some
structure from F , but this contradicts that Γ |=F φ.
What is the significance of Proposition 2? It means essentially that proving
completeness is a question of model-hunting, for all we need to do, given a
consistent set of formulas, is to produce a model (and a valuation) satisfying
that set of formulas. This insight has given rise to a more or less standardized
construction of what is called canonical models and this will be the focus of the
present inquiry in the following. First, we need to produce a set of worlds.
7.1 Worlds of the Canonical Model
Seeing that the overall aim is to produce, given a consistent set of formulas,
a model and a valuation satisfying that set of formulas it is natural to let the
worlds of the canonical model be sets of consistent formulas subject to appro-
priate extra conditions. Truth will then be defined as membership. Imagine
in the following that a Λ– consistent set Ω of formulas is given, and that our
task is to produce a model MΛΩ from F satisfying Ω. First we bring a couple of
important definitions.
Definition 22. [Maximal Λ – Consistent] Let Λ be a logic and Γ a set of wffs.
We say that Γ is maximally Λ – consistent if Γ is Λ – consistent and no proper
extension of Γ is Λ – consistent.
We shall abbreviate such that we write that Γ is a Λ−MSC whenever Γ is
a maximally Λ – consistent set. In order to make the machinery work we need
to make sure that whenever a formula of the form ∀xφ is not included in some
world of the canonical model there must be some “witness” of the falsity. This
motivates the next definition:
Definition 23. [∀ – property] If Γ is a set of formulas, we say that it has the ∀
– property if for every wff φ, for every variable x, there is some variable y such
that
(
φ(y/x)→ ∀xφ
)
∈ Γ. Note, that if some set Γ of wffs has the ∀ – property
then so will every set of wffs of which Γ is a subset.
What follows from definition 23 is that if for some Λ −MSC Γ φ we have
∀xφ 6∈ Γ, then there is some variable y such that φ(y/x) 6∈ Γ. This is the reason
why the ∀ – property is sometimes referred to as “bearing witness”.
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For technical reasons we need to enlarge our language in order to make sure our
construction will function, and so we add to L
A,σ
TM infinitely many new variables
equally divided between V ARagt and V ARobj . The resulting language is called
L+, and note that trivially any wff of L
A,σ
TM is also a wff of L
+. Now we need to
be better acquainted with Λ−MSC’s, and for that we need a Lemma:
Lemma 5. [Completeness Lemma] Let Γ be a consistent set of formulas such
that for all formulas φ either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ. Then Γ is deductively closed,
that is whenever Γ ⊢Λ ψ we have ψ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Assume that Γ has the mentioned property, and that for some formula
φ we have Γ ⊢Λ φ. By assumption either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ but the latter
contradicts the consistency of Γ.
Lemma 6. [Properties of Λ−MCS’s] If Λ is a logic and Γ is a Λ−MCS, then
i) Λ ⊆ Γ
ii) for all formulas φ, either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ
iii) Γis deductively closed
iv) for all formulas φ, ψ : (φ→ ψ) ∈ Γ iff ¬φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ
Proof. i) If φ ∈ Λ \ Γ then the sets Γ ∪ {φ} and Γ ∪ {¬φ} are both proper
extensions of Γand by Lemma 4 one of them is consistent contradicting the
maximality of Γ.
ii) Assume for contradiction that for some formula φ neither φ ∈ Γ nor
¬φ ∈ Γ, meaning that both Γ ∪ {φ} and Γ ∪ {¬φ} are proper extensions of Γ.
By Lemma 4 one of them is consistent contradicting the maximality of Γ.
iii) By assumption Γ is consistent, and so it follows by ii) and Lemma 5 that
Γ is deductively closed.
iv) Assume for contradiction that for some formulas φ and ψ
we have φ → ψ ∈ Γ yet φ ∈ Γ and ¬ψ ∈ Γ yielding {
(
φ → ψ
)
, φ,¬ψ} ⊆ Γ.
By iii) this implies that ψ ∈ Γ by an application of MP, contradicting the
consistency of Γ.
The next needed result is the well-known Lindenbaum’s Lemma. As the
proof is completely standard it will be omitted9.
Lemma 7. [Lindenbaum’s Lemma] Let Γ be a Λ – consistent set of formulas.
Then there exists some Λ−MCS Γ+such that Γ ⊆ Γ+.
Given a consistent set of formulas Γ we, in accordance with Proposition 2,
wish to produce a model and a valuation satisfying Γ. We know by Lemma 7
that we can extend Γ to a maximally consistent set, but Γ is formulated over
L
A,σ
TM and the model we are about to build will be formulated over L
+ so we
need to ascertain ourselves that we can find an appropriate set of formulas over
L+extending Γ. This is the content of the next Lemma:
9For a proof see [1] or [5].
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Lemma 8. [Saturation] Let Γ be a Λ – consistent set of formulas over L
A,σ
TM .
Then there exist a Λ – consistent set Γ+ over L
+ with the ∀ – property such
that Γ ⊆ Γ+.
Proof. Let Γ be a Λ – consistent set of formulas over L
A,σ
TM , and observe that
L+is countable and as any formula is a finite string of symbols from L+the set
of wffs is also countable, meaning that we can enumerate all formulas of the
type ∀xφ over L+. Define now a sequence of sets {∆i}i∈Nby
∆0 := Γ
∆n+1 := ∆n ∪ {ϕ (y/x)→ ∀xϕ}
where we take φ to be the n+1’st formula wrt to the enumeration, and y to
be the first variable(again, relative to the enumeration) not to occur in ∆n nor
φ(and note that this a fortiori means that y does not occur free anywhere in
neither ∆n nor φ). The reason why we introduced the enlarged language L
+was
exactly to ensure that this construction is possible; as ∆0 = Γ ⊆ L
A,σ
TM and only
finitely many new variables are introduced in each step we can always pick the
variable y ∈ L+.
From here the strategy is to show that each ∆i is consistent and then choose our
appropriate set of L+ – formulas as Γ+ =
⋃
i∈N∆i. We proceed by induction.
To establish the induction base simply note that Γ is Λ – consistent by assump-
tion. Now, assume that ∆n is Λ – consistent while ∆n+1 is not. This means
that for some φ1, ..., φk ∈ ∆n we have
⊢Λ (φ1...φk)→ φ(y/x) and
⊢Λ (φ1...φk)→¬∀xφ
As y does not occur free in any of the φi’s we get from the first above and
Gen that ⊢Λ (φ1...φk)→ ∀yφ(y/x) and since y does not occur free in φ this is
equivalent to
10⊢Λ (φ1...φk)→ ∀xφ(x), but this means that
⊢Λ (φ1...φk)→ ∀xφ and
⊢Λ (φ1...φk)→¬∀xφ
contradicting the consistency of ∆n. We conclude that ∆i is Λ – consistent
for every i ∈ N. Put Γ+ =
⋃
i∈N∆i and observe that Γ+ trivially has the ∀ –
property by construction so it remains to show that consistency is “preserved in
the limit”.
For Γ+ to be inconsistent there would have to exist some inconsistent, finite
subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ+ by definition 18, but any such Γ0 would be contained in some
∆i, a contradiction. We conclude that Γ+ is Λ – consistent and has the ∀ –
property.
10See [4] pp. 242, 258.
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Note that the Saturation Lemma does not explicitly ensure preservation of
the ∀ – property; this is not necessary as a set of formulas has the ∀ – property
if any subset has it. We are almost ready to actually define the canonical model
but one more technicality is still pressing. Since variables are rigid and we have
included equality in our language we need to make sure that the same equality
statements are true in each world in the canonical model. To ensure that this
is the case we shall restrict attention to a cohesive subset of the set of worlds
which motivates the following definition:
Definition 24. [R – path connected] Given sets X and Y and a map
R : Y → P(X × X ) associating binary relations on X to each member of
Y, we say that the subset B ⊆ X is R – path connected if for every b, b′ ∈ B
there is a sequence (y1, ..., yk) ⊆ Y, and a sequence (b1, ..., bk−1) ⊆ B such that
(b, b1) ∈ R(y1), (b1, b2) ∈ R(y2),..., (bk−1, b
′) ∈ R(yk).
Note that ifM is a model, then so is anyR – path connected subsetM′ ⊆M
since by definition truth in M′ cannot depend on worlds in M \M′. We are
now ready to define the canonical model for a Λ – consistent set Ω.
7.2 Canonical Models
Definition 25. [Canonical Model] Given a Λ – consistent set Ω from an n –
agent, two-sorted term-modal logic Λ in the language L
A,σ
TM with extension L
+,
we define the canonical model M
Λ
Ω to be the four-tuple
〈
WΛΩ , Dom
Λ,RΛ, IΛ
〉
where
1. WΛΩ is an R
Λ – path connected subset of all Λ– MCS’s with the ∀-property
in L+ containing some Λ– MCS extending Ω.
2. DomΛ =
{
[x] | x ∈ V AR+agt
} ⋃˙{
[y] | y ∈ V AR+obj
}
= AΛ
⋃˙ {
[y] | y ∈ V AR+obj
}
with [z] = {v ∈ V AR+ | z ∼ v} where z ∼ v iff (z = v) ∈ w for any one
w ∈ WΛΩ . Note that we indeed have a partition of the domain by MSD.
3. RΛ : AΛ → P(WΛΩ ×W
Λ
Ω) is a map associating binary accessibility rela-
tions to agents such that (w,w′) ∈ RΛ(αΛi ) iff for every formulaKxϕ ∈ L
+
with x ∈ αΛi ∈ A
Λ if Kxϕ ∈ w, then ϕ ∈ w
′.
4. For each β ∈ σkΛ, w ∈ W
Λ
Ω and P some relation symbol with arity β
let IΛ(P,w) = {
(
[x1]...[xk]
)
∈
∏
i∈{1...k}DOM
Λ
βi
| P (x1, ..., xk) ∈ w}.
For each α ∈ σk+1
Λ
, w ∈ WΛΩ and f some function symbol with arity α let
IΛ(f, w) = {
(
[x1], ..., [xk], [xk+1]
)
∈
∏
i∈{1...k+1}DOM
Λ
αi
|
(
f(x1, ..., xk) =
xk+1
)
∈ w}. For any world w ∈ WΛΩ take I
Λ(=, w) = {(d, d) |d ∈ DomΛ}.
For any constant c ∈ CON , for any world w ∈ WΛΩ ,
IΛ(c, w) = [x] ∈ DomΛ such that (x = c) ∈ w.
Before defining the canonical valuation we need to make sure that the canonical
model is well-defined. This motivates the following Proposition:
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Proposition 3. [Canonical Interpretation of Constants] The canonical inter-
pretation does indeed ascribe extensions to all constants in L+, i.e. for all worlds
w ∈ WΛΩ for every constant c ∈ CON there is y ∈ V AR
+ such that (y = c) ∈ w.
Proof. By the ∀ – property we have for any wff φ and every variable x that there
exists a variable y such that
(
φ(y/x)→ ∀xφ
)
∈ w, and we recall that w is deduc-
tively closed by Lemma 6. By contraposition this yields
(
¬∀xφ→ ¬φ(y/x)
)
∈ w
and thus by substituting ψ := ¬φ that
(
¬∀x¬ψ → ¬¬ψ(y/x)
)
∈ w. Canceling
double-negation and abbreviating using ∃ gets us
(
∃xψ → ψ(y/x)
)
∈ w. By Id,
∃Id and MP we get
(
∃xψ
)
∈ w and thus by another application of MP that
ψ(y/x) ∈ w. Putting ψ := (x = c) now yields (y = c) ∈ w as desired11.
The only thing left to specify is the canonical valuation:
Definition 26. [Canonical Valuation] The Canonical Valuation vΛ is defined
by vΛ(x) = [x] for all x ∈ V AR+.
By construction the domain of the Canonical Model is depending on what
equalities between variables are to be found in the Λ−MCS’s that constitutes
the worlds. As such one might be a little queasy that maybe the occurrence of
different such equalities in different worlds might pose incommensurable claims
on the cardinality of the domain. That this is not a problem needs to be proven:
Proposition 4. [Well – Defined Domain] Let w and w′ be any two worlds
from WΛΩ and x and y any two variables from L
+ we have (x = y) ∈ w iff
(x = y) ∈ w′.
Proof. This is where we need that WΛΩ is R
Λ– path connected. Assume for
x, y ∈ V AR+ and world w ∈ WΛΩ that (x = y) ∈ w. As W
Λ
Ω is R
Λ– path
connected we can find (αΛi , ..., α
Λ
k ) ⊆ A
Λ and (w1, ..., wk−1) ⊆ W
Λ
Ω such that
(w,w1) ∈ R(α
Λ
1 ), (w1, w2) ∈ R(α
Λ
2 ),..., and (wk−1, w
′) ∈ R(αΛk ). Furthermore,
let the terms t1, ..., tk ∈ Term
Λ
agt be such that ti designates α
Λ
i for i = 1, ..., k.
As worlds are deductively closed cf. Lemma 6 we get by an application of KG
that Kt1(x = y) ∈ w and thus by the definition of R
Λ we have (x = y) ∈ w′.
Repeating this procedure k times yields the desired result.
In the definition of the canonical model we made sure that whenever a for-
mula of the form Ktφ where contained in some world w,
we had (w,w′) ∈ RΛ(tw,v
Λ
) only when φ ∈ w′. However, we also need to make
sure that the interplay between RΛ and formulas of the type Ptφ is appropriate,
i.e. if Ptφ ∈ w then there must be some w
′ such that (w,w′) ∈ RΛ(tw,v
Λ
) with
φ ∈ w′. This is the content of the next Proposition:
Proposition 5. [Existence] If w ∈ WΛΩ such that Pxφ ∈ w, then there is
w′ ∈ WΛΩ such that (w,w
′) ∈ R(αΛi ) and φ ∈ w
′.
11Strictly speaking the proof uses that there is a one-to-one correspondence between for-
mulas φ and ¬φ but this is trivial. Note also that contraposition and tertium non datur
are substitution instanses of valid formulas from propositional modal logic, and thus at our
disposal.
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Proof. The proof is constructive so assume Pxφ ∈ w for some world w ∈ W
Λ
Ω and
some variable x with vΛ(x) = αΛi . The aim is then to produce a world w
′ such
that (w,w′) ∈ R(αΛi ) and φ ∈ w
′. Consider the set Γ = {ψ}∪{φ|Kxφ ∈ w}. We
first show that Γ is indeed Λ – consistent, so assume otherwise. As {φ|Kxφ ∈ w}
is consistent this means that there are φ1, ..., φn ∈ {φ |Kxφ ∈ w} such that
⊢Λ
(
φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn
)
→ ¬ψ
by KG and two applications of K this yields
⊢Λ
(
Kxφ1 ∧ ... ∧Kxφn
)
→ Kx¬ψ.
Since w is an Λ −MCS containing Kxφi for i = 1, ..., n we can conclude that(
Kxφ1 ∧ ... ∧ Kxφn
)
∈ w and thus by MP also Kx¬ψ ∈ w, but by the def-
inition of Px this means that ¬Pxψ ∈ w contradicting the consistency of w.
We conclude that the set Γ is indeed Λ – consistent. The idea from here
is to construct a sequence of formulas {ψi}i∈N in a fitting manner such that
{
⋃
i∈N ψi} ∪ {φ |Kxφ ∈ w} is a Λ – consistent set with the ∀ – property that
can be extended by Lindenbaum’s Lemma to an Λ −MCS with the required
properties.
To define the sequence {ψi}i∈N we first define a couple of enumerations; first
we enumerate all formulas of the type ∀yλ, and then letting ∀yλ be the n +
1’th such formula we define the sequence {ψi}i∈N inductively by ψ0 = ψ (from
Γ) and ψn+1 = ψn ∧ {λ(z/y) → ∀yλ} where z 6= x is a variable such that
{φ |Kxφ ∈ w}∪
(
ψn ∧{λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ}
)
is consistent. That it is always possible
to choose such variable z is now shown:
Assume that {ψn}∪{φ|Kxφ ∈ w} is consistent and assume for contradiction that
{φ|Kxφ ∈ w}∪
(
ψn∧{λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ}
)
is inconsistent for every variable z of L+.
This means that for every variable z we could find {χ1, ..., χn} ⊆ {φ |Kxφ ∈ w}
such that
⊢Λ
(
χn ∧ ... ∧ χn
)
→ ¬
((
ψn ∧ {λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ}
))
which by standard logic is equivalent to
⊢Λ
(
χn ∧ ... ∧ χn
)
→
(
ψn → {λ(z/y) ∧ ¬∀yλ}
)
and by Lemma 3 we get
⊢Λ Kx
(
χn ∧ ... ∧ χn
)
→ Kx
(
ψn → {λ(z/y) ∧ ¬∀yλ}
)
further, by Lemma 2 we get
⊢Λ
(
Kxχn ∧ ... ∧Kxχn
)
→ Kx
(
ψn → {λ(z/y) ∧ ¬∀yλ}
)
.
Seeing that {χ1, ..., χn} ⊆ w by definition we get by Lemma 6 that(
Kxχn ∧ ... ∧ Kxχn
)
⊆ w and thus by an application of MP that
Kx
(
ψn → {λ(z/y) ∧ ¬∀yλ}
)
⊆ w for every variable z of the language. Now, if
z 6= x is some variable occurring in neither λ nor ψn we consider the formula
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∀zKx
(
ψn → ¬(λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ)
)
and see that by the ∀ – property the formula there is some variable z′ such that
Kx
(
ψn → ¬(λ(z
′/y)→ ∀yλ)
)
→
(
∀zKx
(
ψn → ¬(λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ)
))
∈ w.
But we just showed that Kx
(
ψn → {λ(z/y)∧¬∀yλ}
)
⊆ w for every z ∈ V AR+
and so by an application of MP we obtain
∀zKx
(
ψn → ¬(λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ)
)
∈ w.
Furthermore, as x 6= z we see that
∀zKx
(
ψn → ¬(λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ)
)
→ Kx∀z
(
ψn → ¬(λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ)
)
is an instance of BF and so included in w. An application of MP yields
Kx∀z
(
ψn → ¬(λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ)
)
∈ w
and utilizing that whenever x does not occur free in φ, ∀x(φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ∀xψ)
is a Theorem of first-order logic12 we obtain that
Kx
(
ψn → ∀z¬(λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ)
)
∈ w (1)
since by assumption z does not occur (free) in ψn. Recall that whenever y is not
free in ∀xφ, ∃x
(
φ(y/x)→ ∀xφ
)
is a Theorem of first-order logic, from which we
get
∃z
(
λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ
)
. (2)
Seeing that 1 can be re-written as Kx
(
ψn → ¬∃z
(
λ(z/y) → ∀yλ
))
∈ w we
conclude thatKx¬ψn ∈ w contradicting the consistency of {ψn}∪{φ|Kxφ ∈ w}.
We conclude that it is indeed possible to choose z 6= x such that
{φ |Kxφ ∈ w} ∪
(
ψn ∧ {λ(z/y)→ ∀yλ}
)
= {φ |Kxφ ∈ w} ∪ {ψn+1} (3)
is Λ – consistent. Now, consider the set {φ | Kxφ ∈ w} ∪ {
⋃
n∈N ψn}. First,
for all n, {φ | Kxφ ∈ w} ∪ {ψn} is consistent by the above. Second, we see
that ⊢Λ ψn → ψm for all n ≥ m such that {φ | Kxφ ∈ w} ∪ {
⋃
n∈N ψn} is
consistent too. Further, by construction the set has the ∀ – property, and so
can be extended to an Λ − MCS by Lindenbaum - call this set w′. This is
the world we set out to produce; by construction φ ∈ w′ and so we have by
definition that (w,w′) ∈ RΛ(xw,v
Λ
).
Having secured the needed-in-a-second existence-result another worry presents
itself; for if Kxφ ∈ w for some world w, some wff φ, and some agent-referring
variable x yet for some variable y designating the same agent as x we had
Kyφ /∈w we have a problem. To see this note that by Lemma 6 that ¬Kyφ ∈ w
or equivalently Py¬φ ∈ w, but by the Proposition just proved we have a world
w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ RΛ(yw,v
Λ
) and ¬φ ∈ w′ contradicting the assumption
that Kxφ ∈ w. That this does not obtain is the content of the next Proposition:
Proposition 6. [Uniformity] Let w ∈ WΛΩ such that Kxφ ∈ w for wff φ and
variable x with vΛ(x) = αΛi ∈A
Λ. Then for all variables y with vΛ(x) = vΛ(y)
we have Kyψ ∈ w.
12See [4] pp. 242.
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Proof. Let w ∈ WΛΩ such that Kxφ ∈ w for wff φ and variable x with v
Λ(x) =
αΛi ∈ A
Λ.
Further, let y be such that vΛ(x) = vΛ(y), but this means that [x] = [y] so
by the definition of the canonical model and Proposition 4 we have (x = y) ∈ w′
for every w′ ∈ WΛΩ , hence a fortiori (x = y) ∈ w. By PS we get
(x = y)→
(
Kxφ→ Kyφ
)
∈ w
and thus by MP that
(
Kxφ → Kyφ
)
∈ w. By assumption we have Kxφ ∈ w
and so one more application of MP yields Kyφ ∈ w as desired.
Obviously, the idea is that “truth is membership” in the canonical model,
and we are now in position to prove that this is exactly the case.
Lemma 9. [Truth] For every w ∈ WΛΩ , for every φ ∈ L
+we haveM
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ φ
iff φ ∈ w.
As the proof of the truth Lemma will be by induction of the complexity of
φ we need to make this notion precise first.
Definition 27. [Complexity] For any wff φ of the language, for any variable x
and any term-referring term t, the complexity c(φ) of φ is given by
c(φ) = 0, for all atomic formulas φ
c(φ→ ψ) = max{c(φ), c(ψ)}+ 1
c(¬φ) = c(∀xφ) = c(Ktφ) = c(φ) + 1
Proof. Proof of the Truth Lemma by induction on the complexity of φ.
Equality: If t1, t2 are terms and w ∈ W
Λ
Ω then we have M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ (t1 = t2)
iff
(
tw,v
Λ
1 , t
w,vΛ
2
)
∈ IΛ(=, w) which in turn holds iff
(
tw,v
Λ
1 = t
w,vΛ
2
)
. Now, by
the definition of extensions in the canonical model this is the case iff for some
x ∈ V AR+ we have tw,v
Λ
1 , t
w,vΛ
2 ∈ [x] iff (t1 = x) ∈ w and (t2 = x) ∈ w and as
w is deductively closed (t1 = t2) ∈ w as desired.
Atomic Formulas: Let P be a predicate symbol of arity β ∈ σΛ and
t1, ..., tk ∈ Term
+such that ti is of sort βi. Then, M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ P (t1, ..., tk) iff(
tw,v
Λ
1 , ..., t
w,vΛ
k
)
=
(
[x1], ..., [xk]
)
∈ IΛ(P,w) which in turn holds iff
P (x1, ..., xk) ∈ w and as by assumption (ti = xi) ∈ w for i = 1, ..., k this is
equivalent to P (t1, ..., tk) ∈ w by deductive closedness.
Negation: Assume the truth Lemma for a wff φ, then we haveM
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ¬φ
iff not M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ φ iff φ /∈ w by the induction hypothesis. By 6 we get ¬φ ∈ w
as desired.
Implication: Assume the truth Lemma for wffs φ, ψ. Then we have
M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ φ → ψ iff either M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ¬φ or M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ψ which in turn
holds iff either ¬φ ∈ w or ψ ∈ w by the induction hypothesis. Then Lemma 6
yields φ→ ψ ∈ w as desired.
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Universal: We first show that if M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ∀xφ then ∀xφ ∈ w, so assume
truth Lemma for wffs of complexity lower than ∀xφ, and that M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ∀xφ.
Thus, for all x – variants vΛ
′
, M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ′ φ. Now, by the ∀ – property there
exists variable y0 such that
(
φ(y0/x)→ ∀xφ
)
∈ w , and asM
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ′ φ holds
for all x – variants we can in particular choose vΛ
′
such that vΛ(x) = vΛ
′
(y0) but
then we get by Proposition 1 that M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ′ φ(y0/x), and by the induction
hypothesis φ(y0/x) ∈ w. An application of MP yields ∀xφ ∈ w as desired.
For the converse we proceed by contraposition, so assume ∀xφ /∈ w. By Lemma
6 we get ¬∀xφ ∈ w, and by a contrapositive application of the ∀ – property we
get ¬φ(y0/x) ∈ w for some variable y0 and thus by the induction hypothesis
M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ¬φ(y0/x). This means for the specific x – variant v
Λ
′
such that
vΛ
′
(x) = vΛ(y0) we get by Proposition 1 that M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ′ ¬φ(x) and thus
M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ∃x¬φ(x) or equivalently M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ¬∀xφ(x) as desired.
Modal: We first show that if Kxφ ∈ w then M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ Kxφ, so assume
the truth Lemma for wffs of lower complexity than Kxφ, and let Kxφ ∈ w for
some variable x such that vΛ(x) = αΛi . If w
′ ∈ WΛΩ is any world such that
(w,w′) ∈ RΛ(αΛi ) we have by definition that φ ∈ w
′ and thus by the induction
hypothesis that M
Λ
Ω, w
′ |=vΛ φ. As this holds for every such w
′ we conclude
that M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ Kxφ as desired.
We prove the converse by contraposition so assume Kxφ /∈ w for some variable
x such that vΛ(x) = αΛi . By Lemma 6 we thus have ¬Kxφ ∈ w, or equivalently
Px¬φ ∈ w. Now, Proposition 5 yields the existence of some world w
′ ∈ WΛΩ
such that ¬φ ∈ w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ RΛ(αΛi ). By the induction hypothesis
M
Λ
Ω, w
′ |=vΛ ¬φ and thus M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ Px¬φor equivalently M
Λ
Ω, w |=vΛ ¬Kxφ
as desired.
Before moving on, let us ascertain what we have accomplished so far. Given
a Λ – consistent set Ω formulated in language L
A,σ
TM we have produced a model
formulated in language L+ satisfying Ω, but in order to be able to argue for
completeness via Proposition 2 we have rather to produce a model formulated
in L
A,σ
TM . Luckily, this is not really a problem since all we have to do is to restrict
the canonical valuation vΛ
|L
A,σ
TM
, and throw away the excess variables from the
language. To convince oneself that this is legitimate simply consider why we
introduced new variables in the first place; they were never to be used as part
of the language but rather as part of the domain. Having acquainted ourselves
with the canonical model we shall zoom out; instead of considering, for each Λ
– consistent set Ω a model, we shall rather consider the class of such models.
This motivates the following definition:
Definition 28. [Canonical Class] Let Λ be a normal two-sorted term-modal
logic. Then we define the class MΛ of canonical models as the set of models
MΛΩ for each Λ – consistent set Ω.
24
Which brings us to the main result:
Theorem 2. [Canonical Class Theorem] Let Λ be a normal two-sorted term-
modal logic. Then Λ is complete wrt. the class MΛ of canonical models for
Λ.
Proof. By Proposition 2 proving completeness of Λ wrt. MΛis simply a question
of, given some Λ – consistent set Ω, producing some element in MΛon which Ω
is satisfied. By Lemmas 7 and 8 we can extend Ω to an Λ−MCS w with the ∀ –
property, and we can find a model MΛΩ ∈M
Λ such that Ω ⊆ w ∈MΛΩ which by
Lemma 9 gives that MΛΩ , w |=vΛ Ω . As this holds for every Λ – consistent set
Ω we conclude that Λ is complete wrt. the class MΛ of canonical models.
A corollary of this is that KTM
A,σ is complete wrt. the class of all TMσA –
frames.
Corollary 1. The logic KTM
A,σ is complete wrt. the class of all TMσA –
frames.
Proof. By Proposition 2 we have to produce, for each KTM
A,σ– consistent set
Ω a world w in a model M based on some TMσA – frame and a valuation v
such that M, w |=v Ω. Now, choose the model to be M
KTM
A,σ
Ω , the world w
to be some Ω – extending KTM
A,σ −MCS, and the valuation to be vKTM
A,σ
.
Now we have M
KTM
A,σ
Ω , w |=vKTMA,σ Ω by Lemma 9, and we conclude that
KTM
A,σ is complete wrt. the class of all TMσA – frames by Theorem 2.
Conclusively, KTM
A,σ is sound and complete wrt. the class of all TMσA –
frames.
8 Applications of the Canonical Class Theorem
In this section applications of the Canonical Class Theorem will be explored, and
soundness and completeness for the term-modal version of S4 will be proved.
It is a fact from standard modal logic that the axioms T (i.e. ∀x
(
Kxφ → φ
)
),
5 (i.e. ∀x
(
Pxφ → KxPxφ
)
) and 4 (i.e. ∀x
(
Kxφ → KxKxφ
)
) characterizes the
class of reflexive, euclidian, and transitive frames respectively (cf. [1, pp. 128])
and the appropriate term-modal version of these results will now be stated and
proved.
Lemma 10. [Axiom T ] Let x be any agent-referring variable, and φ any wff
of L
A,σ
TM . The axiom ∀x
(
Kxφ → φ
)
characterizes the class of frames in which
R(α) is reflexive for all α ∈ A.
Proof. Recall that a relation R on a set W is reflexive iff for all w ∈W we have
that wRw. We show first that if for some frame F = 〈W ,R, DOM〉,R(α) is
reflexive for all α ∈ A then the axiom ∀Kxφ → φ is valid on F for any agent-
referring variable x. Fix some agent-referring variable x, world w ∈ W , and wff
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φ. Assume further that R(xw,v) is reflexive.
It suffices to show that M, w |= Kxφ → φ by surjectivity of valutions, so
assume M, w |= Kxφ. By reflexivity we have (w,w) ∈ R(x
w,v) and so by the
semantics for Kx that M, w |= φ as desired.
The converse is shown by contraposition: Assume R(α) is non-reflexive for some
agent α ∈ A, i.e. for some world w ∈ W we have (w,w) /∈ R(α). Now we can
pick the interpretation such that for the resulting modelM, we haveM, w 6|= φ
while for all w′ ∈ W \ {w} we have M, w′ |= φ. By the semantics of Kx we get
that M, w |= Kxφ yet M, w 6|= φ.
Lemma 11. [Axiom 5] Let x be any agent-referring variable, and φ any wff of
L
A,σ
TM . The axiom ∀x
(
Pxφ→ KxPxφ
)
characterizes the class of frames in which
R(α) is euclidian for all α ∈A.
Proof. Recall that a relation R on a set W is euclidian iff. for all
v, u, w ∈ W if uRv and uRw then vRw. We show first that if for some
frame F = 〈W ,R, DOM〉,R(α) is euclidian for all α ∈ A then the axiom
∀x
(
Pxφ→ KxPxφ
)
is valid on F for any agent-referring variable x, so fix some
agent-referring variable x, world w ∈ W , and any wff φ. Assume further that
R(xw,v) is euclidian and see that it suffices to show thatM, w |= Pxφ→ KxPxφ,
so assumeM, w |= Pxφ. By assumption there is w
′ ∈ W such thatM, w′ |= φ. If
w′ is the only world accessible from w we have by definition thatM,w |= KxPxφ
so assume otherwise, i.e. there is some u 6= w′ ∈ W s.t (w, u) ∈ R(xw,v). As
R(xw,v) is euclidian we get that (u,w′) ∈ R(xw,v) and thus M,u |= Pxφ and
then M,w |= KxPxφ as desired.
The converse is shown by contraposition, so let R(α) is non-euclidian for some
agent α ∈A,
i.e. for worlds w, v, u ∈ W we have (w, v) ∈ R(α) and (w, u) ∈ R(α) while
(v, u) /∈ R(α). We can now choose our interpretation such that in the resulting
model M, we have M, v |= φ yet M, w 6|= φ for every w ∈ W \ {v}. Now,
M, w |= Pxφ yet M, w 6|= KxPxφ as desired.
Lemma 12. [Axiom 4] Let x be any agent-referring variable, and φ any wff
of L
A,σ
TM . The axiom ∀x
(
Kxφ → KxKxφ
)
characterizes the class of frames in
which R(α) is transitive for all α ∈A.
Proof. Recall that a relation R on a set W is transitive iff. for all
v, u, w ∈ W if vRu and uRw then vRw. We show first that if for some
frame F = 〈W ,R, DOM〉,R(α) is transitive for all α ∈ A then the axiom
∀x
(
Kxφ→ KxKxφ
)
is valid on F for any agent-referring variable x, so fix some
agent-referring variable x, world w ∈ W , and any wff φ, and see that it suffices to
show thatM,w |= Kxφ→ KxKxφ, so assumeM, w |= Pxφ. If v, u ∈ W is such
that (w, v) ∈ R(α) and (v, u) ∈ R(α) we have by transitivity that (w, u) ∈ R(α)
and thus by assumption that M, u |= φ, such that M, v |= Kxφ meaning that
M, w |= KxKxφ as desired.
The converse is shown by contraposition, so let R(α) be non-transitive for
some agent α ∈ A, i.e. for worlds w, v, u ∈ W we have (w, v) ∈ R(α)
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and (v, u) ∈ R(α) while (w, u) /∈ R(α). We can now choose an interpreta-
tion such that in the resulting model, we have M, u 6|= φ while M, v |= φ for
all v ∈ W \ {u}. By construction we haveM, w |= Kxφ yet M, w 6|= KxKxφ as
desired.
Definition 29. [TMσ.K4, TMσ.K5, and TMσ.KT ] Denote by TMσ.K4,
TMσ.K5, and TMσ.KT the logics resulting from adding to KTM
A,σ the
axiom ∀x
(
Kxφ→ KxKxφ
)
, ∀x
(
Pxφ→ KxPxφ
)
, and ∀x
(
Kxφ→ φ
)
respectively
for any agent-referring variable x and wff φ, and closing the resulting collection
of formulas under MP, KG, and Gen.
Corollary 2. [Soundness TMσ.K4, TMσ.K5, and TMσ.KT ] The logic
TMσ.K4 is sound wrt. the class of transitive TM
σ
A – frames, the logic
TMσ.K5 is sound wrt. the class of euclidian TM
σ
A – frames, and the logic
TMσ.KT is sound wrt. the class of reflexive TM
σ
A – frames.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 and Lemmas 12, 11, and 10.
Theorem 3. [Completeness TMσ.K4] The logic TMσ.K4 is complete wrt.
the class of transitive TMσA – frames.
Proof. By Proposition 2 it suffices to produce, given any TMσ.K4 – consistent
set Ω, a model based on some frame from the class of all transitive TMσA –
frames, a world and a valuation satisfying Ω. Obviously, we are going to choose
the model to be MTMσ.K4Ω the world to be some Ω – extending TMσ.K4−
MCS w, and the valuation to be the canonical valuation vTMσ.K4, such that
it follows from Lemma 9 that MTMσ.K4
Ω
, w |= Ω. It remains to show that
MTMσ.K4Ω is indeed based on a transitive frame, but cf. Lemma 12 this amounts
to showing that the axiom ∀x
(
Kxφ→ KxKxφ
)
is satisfied onMTMσ.K4
Ω
, which
is fulfilled by Lemma 12. We conclude that MTMσ.K4
Ω
is based on a transitive
TMσA – frame and the desired conclusion follows.
The interested reader may note that compactness is a sitting duck at this
point - I will however, not make this point explicit since I am already in excess
of keystrokes. Recall our brief discussion of Descartes cogito from the intro-
duction; we are now equipped with a logic in which ∀y∃xKy(x = y) is a wff of
the language, and we know that it exhibits appropriate behavior as far as the
relation between syntax and semantics go. Before turning the key a few words
on Hintikka and the logic TMσ.K4 are in order.
9 Hintikka Revisited
As an answer to Hintikka’s 1962 footnote we can now present the logic TMσ.K4.
We have, as queried, partitioned terms in those that form well-formed sentences
of the kind Ktφ and those which do not, and we know that the logic is sound
and complete wrt. the class of transitive TMσA – frames. Yet, a comment is in
order. We have included the 4 – axiom ∀x
(
Kxφ→ KxKxφ
)
, but the equivalent
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axiom in [3] reads Kap → KaKap
13. Further, Hintikka insists that the agent
whom is referred to by a must know who he is for the axiom to make sense,
and formalizes this demand as ∃xKa(x = a)
14. As it turns out, if interpreted in
the framework presented here, there is a rather nice motivation for taking the
axiom ∃xKa(x = a) as necessary for Kap→ KaKap for assume we evaluate the
latter over the class of transitive frames; it turns out that the axiom is not even
valid.
Proposition 7. [Kap→ KaKap is not valid on the class of transitive TM
σ
A –
frames] Let a be any agent-referring constant. Then, the formulaKap→ KaKap
is not valid over the class of transitive TMσA – frames.
Proof. We show the Proposition by constructing a counter-example. Choose
some modelM, some world w in the class of transitive TMσA – frames, some wff
φ, a valuation v, and some agent-referring constant a such that M, w |=v Kaφ.
It is certainly possible to choose the above such that for some world w′ we have
(w,w′) ∈ R(aw,v). Now, since constants are non-rigid we can even choose the
interpretation such that I(a, w) 6= I(a, w′), and thus if t is yet another world
such that (w′, t) ∈ R(aw’,v) we do not have by transitivity that (w, t) ∈ R(aw,v).
We can even choose our model such that M, t 6|=v φ, yielding M, w
′ 6|=v Kaφ
and subsequently M, w 6|=v KaKaφ.
Comparing the above Proposition with the proof of Lemma 12 we see that,
unsurprisingly, what goes wrong is an effect of the non-rigidity of constants.
In plain English we do not know, that the referent of a is the same in all
worlds and that enables us to construct a counter example. What would be the
effect of adding Hintikka’s “Knowing who” – axiom ∃xKa(x = a)? Take world
w, a valuation v, and model M from the proof of Proposition 7 and assume
∃xKa(x = a) as an axiom. Now, as M, w |=v ∃xKa(x = a) we get by the
definition of ∃ that M, w |=v ¬∀x¬Ka(x = a) and thus by the semantics of ∀
that M, w |=v′ Ka(x = a) for some x – variant v
′ of v. By the semantics of
Ka we get for any world w
′ with (w,w′) ∈ R(aw,v
′
) that M, w′ |=v′ (x = a).
Denote by d the referent of x and note that the consequence of the above is that
I(a, w′) = d for any world w′ with (w,w′) ∈ R(aw,v
′
). This makes way for the
last result of this paper:
Proposition 8. [Knowing Who] Assuming ∃xKa(x = a) as an axiom yields
validity of Kap → KaKap for any agent-referring constant a on the class of
transitive TMσA – frames.
Proof. Take world w, valuation v, and modelM based on the class of transitive
TMσA – frames and assume M, w |=v Kap for agent-referring constant a and
wff p. If w′ is a world such that (w,w′) ∈ R(aw,v) we get M, w′ |=v p and if t
is yet another world such that (w′, t) ∈ R(aw
′,v) we make the observation that
13I will not go into Hintikka’s semantics which differs from the kripkean semantics employed
throughout the present work.
14Again, this is formally a translation from Hintikka’s framework into the framework devel-
oped here. However, it seems rather harmless.
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R(aw,v) = R(aw
′,v). By transitivity this yields (w, t) ∈ R(aw,v) and then by
assumptionM, t |=v p which in turn impliesM, w
′ |= Kap andM, w |= KaKap
as desired.
Hintikka’s motivation for demanding the “Knowing Who” – axiom as prereq-
uisite for his version of the axiom 4 is quiet different than the above sketched,
but internal to the Kripkean framework employed here Propositions 7 and 8
offers separate justification.
10 Conclusion
I have stated language and syntax for a two-sorted term-modal logic. I have
presented an axiomatic system for the logic KTM
A,σ, and shown it to be both
sound and complete wrt. the class of all TMσA – frames. Then I have added
the “term-modal” version of axiom 4 and shown the logic TMσ.K4 to be both
sound and complete wrt. the class of transitive TMσA – frames. Lastly, I have
discussed the version of axiom 4 that Hintikka puts forward in [3], and suggested
a motivation for presupposing the “Knowing Who” – axiom in a Kripkean frame-
work.
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